


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Survey of Communist Military Developments in Indochina

DIA review(s) completed.

Secret

October 24, 1974

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
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SURVEY OF COMMUNIST
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA*

(This report covers the period
October 10-23, 1974)



* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

October 24, 1974


Preface

This report summarizes evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam, (II) significant Communist combat activity, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

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Logistic Developments



5. In other logistic activity, the North Vietnamese apparently are continuing to expand their petroleum products system in South Vietnam. [redacted]

[redacted] a small petroleum products storage facility is under construction at Ben Giang in Quang Nam Province adjacent to Route 14. Ten probable 17-metric-ton tanks were identified at the facility, but no pipeline trace was observed. The pipeline almost certainly will be extended to the facility, however, as in late June the pipeline was identified only 20 miles north of Ben Giang (see the transportation map).

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II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam

6. During the past two weeks, combat activity in South Vietnam registered a slight upsurge but still remained at a relatively low level. The daily average of Communist cease-fire violations increased from 88 for the previous reporting period to 95 for the two-week period.


7. The heaviest fighting continues to be concentrated in northern MR 1, where the Communists have been attempting to inflict further losses on ARVN forces manning Hue's defenses and to gain advantageous positions in the high ground overlooking lines of communication into the former imperial capital. On October 18, Communist forces captured six Regional Force outposts some 10 miles northwest of Hue. On the same day, they launched attacks against ARVN 1st Division units that were attempting to retake Mo Tau Mountain, a key terrain feature, from which the NVA/VC direct fire on Phu Bai Air Base. As a result, the MR 1 commander announced a new plan to retake the mountain; this operation began on October 22. Staff officers state that the size of the NVA defensive force, the terrain, and the weather all militate against the success of the new offensive. To date, only light activity and little success has been reported. In southern MR 1, Communist forces reacting to Airborne Division sweep operations suffered some 160 killed during assaults on airborne troops northeast of Thuong Duc on October 17 and 18; government losses were less than 25.

8. In MR 2, Communist forces continue to react to GVN activities in the An Lao Valley of Binh Dinh Province, which have effectively interdicted an NVA north-south supply route.

9. Communist sapper activity has increased throughout the country, including the environs of Saigon in MR 3. Bridges, lines of communication, small outposts, and ammunition storage areas have been principal targets. The Hoa An Bridge on Route 1 west of Bien Hoa was seriously damaged on October 21, and two hamlets west of Saigon were attacked by B-40 rocket fire on the 24th. To date, in spite of this activity, government troops have been able to repair or bypass damaged lines of communications, thereby ensuring movement of troops and materiel. The MR 1 deputy commander noted, however, that sapper attacks against bridges and culverts on QL-1 in his area since January 1 had almost exhausted public works funds for their repair with no relief in sight.

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Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative

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10. The level of incidents and resulting casualties remained relatively high in MR 4, most of which, however, are the result of minor contacts and low-level actions against isolated outposts. Kien Phong, Kien Giang, and Vinh Binh Provinces were the most active.

III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina

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[redacted] an October 15 article in *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* -- the Army newspaper -- which emphasized the importance of protecting North Vietnam's territorial waters. In this regard, two South Vietnamese fishing boats were seized 5 miles from Dong Hoi on October 5.

Tanks Moving in the North Vietnamese Panhandle

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13. [redacted] seven confirmed tanks, one probable tank, and one probable armored personnel carrier in transit in the North Vietnamese Panhandle. All were on flatcars at the Cong Phu rail siding south of Thanh Hoa where armored vehicles destined for storage at the nearby Luong Dien armor dispersal facility have been offloaded in the past. It could not be determined whether the armored vehicles were being transported into or out of the area. Although it is possible they were being deployed south, Luong Dien has only a limited armor training and maintenance capability, and they possibly were being transported elsewhere for training and maintenance.

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